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Abstract   
The ambivalent role of religion in modern citizenship is hardly new, whether in terms of the “hardware” (legal-
political institutions and processes) or “software” (public attitudes and habits). Faith narratives can vigorously 
contest liberal claims of civil belonging and freedom, such as on gender and secularism. Yet liberal citizenship 
also benefits from justice claims anchored in interpretations of religion, ranging from equality and solidarity to 
nonviolence and reconciliation. Identity politics is a formative part of liberal citizenship, with a dominant tribal 
discourse legitimated by the accommodation of minority ethno-religious claims to equity and equality. Nativist 
populism aggravates an already adversarial relationship between faith and liberal citizenship, notably for 
minority religions. This paper argues for symbiosis between liberal citizenship and diverse religious 
identities—a political theology that takes pluralism seriously. While liberalism purports to minimize 
expectations of individual virtue, civic pluralism calls for the inclusion of collective and individual ethical 
commitments, beyond ruptures of secular and sacred that shape a jurisprudence on the “burdens of 
accommodation.” Evidence from Canada, among other liberal settings, suggests that the alternative is civic 
fragmentation that favours majoritarian tribalism. 
 
Résumé   
Le rôle ambivalent de la religion dans la citoyenneté moderne n’est guère nouveau, que ce soit en termes de 
«matériel» (institutions et processus juridico-politiques) ou de «logiciel» (attitudes et habitudes du public). Les 
récits de foi peuvent contester vigoureusement les revendications libérales d'appartenance civile et de liberté, 
telles que le genre et la laïcité. Pourtant, la citoyenneté libérale bénéficie également de revendications de justice 
ancrées dans les interprétations de la religion, allant de l'égalité et de la solidarité à la non-violence et à la 
réconciliation. La politique identitaire est une partie formatrice de la citoyenneté libérale, avec un discours 
tribal dominant légitimé par l’accommodement des revendications ethno-religieuses des minorités à l'équité 
et à l'égalité. Le populisme nativiste aggrave une relation déjà conflictuelle entre la foi et la citoyenneté libérale, 
notamment pour les religions minoritaires. Cet article préconise la symbiose entre la citoyenneté libérale et 
diverses identités religieuses - une théologie politique qui prend le pluralisme au sérieux. Alors que le 
libéralisme vise à minimiser les attentes de vertu individuelle, le pluralisme civique appelle à l'inclusion 
d'engagements éthiques collectifs et individuels, au-delà des ruptures laïques et sacrées qui façonnent une 
jurisprudence sur les «fardeaux de l'accommodement». Des données provenant du Canada, entre autres 
milieux libéraux, suggèrent que l'alternative est la fragmentation civique qui favorise le tribalisme majoritaire. 
Keywords: Citizenship, secularism, pluralism, nationalism, symbiosis, populism, thymos, philia, minorities, 
shari’a, political theology, civic totalism 
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“There is nothing special about solidarity that comes wrapped in a national flag, other than 
that it is the version that modern governments have come to insist matters most. 
Charles King, America’s Original Identity Politics, Foreign Affairs, Nov 7, 2019. 
“The conceit of law’s autonomy from culture is joined by the conceit of religion’s autonomy 
from the other determinants of political and economic freedom and justice. 
Benjamin Berger, Law’s Religion, 2015, 198. 
 
When in the spring of 2019 the province of Quebec tabled its “secularism law”—titled the 
“act respecting the laicity of the State”1—it began with a preambular flourish. Recalling its 
roots in France’s modern ideological arc, the act affirms that “the Québec nation has its own 
characteristics, one of which is its civil law tradition, distinct social values and a specific 
history that have led it to develop a particular attachment to State laicity”.  This attachment 
is deemed to require a “prohibition on wearing religious symbols” by anyone delivering a 
public service, from legislative officers, judges and lawyers to teachers, doctors, and daycare 
providers. People delivering such services must have “their face uncovered” – as must those 
receiving services, when this is felt “necessary to allow their identity to be verified or for 
security reasons”.  
Exceptions are allowed on grounds of disability or health. But pointedly not for purposes 
of “accommodation or other derogation or adaptation”, the kind that is part of the daily lives 
of Canadians elsewhere.2 Lest it be thought this attachment to laicity might affect not just the 
obvious targets—expressive Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, and the like—but also expressive facets 
of the “Quebec nation” itself, the legislation warns that it “must not be interpreted as affecting 
the emblematic or toponymic elements of Québec’s cultural heritage, in particular of its 
religious cultural heritage, that testify to its history.” Indeed, it wasn’t tabled by the minister 
of justice or cultural affairs but of “immigration, inclusiveness and diversity,” Simon Jolin-
Barrette. The irony of seeking inclusiveness by privileging the exclusive identity of a certain 
stock of citizens, in the name of “State neutrality”, appears to have been lost. Not surprisingly, 
minority groups, schools and major public figures in Quebec reacted with dismay and 
pledges of resistance (Lowrie, 2019). Such responses are commonly regarded as “identity 
politics”, in contrast to the liberal state’s defence of equal citizenship as a secular ideal.  
Yet the politics of identity is hardwired in the legislation itself, with its preferential 
branding of who properly belongs in Quebec’s public culture. The branding, it should be 
noted, has majority support within the province.3 But if a “creedal” identity is to be cultivated 
in support of provincial solidarity, as the law claims, is an ethno-nationalist version of that 
identity tenable? Where does this leave inclusive citizenship, with the state as guarantor, as 
also envisaged in the legislation’s secularist narrative? Eric Kaufman goes further, arguing 
that even if universalist, creedal ideas of nationhood foster unity, they can’t offer “deep 
identity in everyday life” (Kaufman, 2019, 10-11). After all, class, generational, and urban-
rural divides do not spare Quebecers who happen to be white and francophone. The 
complexity of these markers and the folly of reducing them to singular measures of political 
choice was brought home in 2016 on both sides of the Atlantic: the Brexit referendum and 
the election of Donald Trump.4 What, then, guides the quest for “deep identity” in liberal 
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democratic settings where citizenship enjoys constitutional primacy, with rule of law 
protections and the institutional capacity to treat the protections seriously?  
This paper begins with a critique of identity politics as a perceived rival of inclusive 
citizenship, a tension that is heightened by prevailing tides of populism. While the empirical 
focus is on evidence from Canada, comparative reference is made to liberal democracies on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Why Canada in particular? A consolidated democracy with an 
updated constitutional framework (1982) and a public culture that stakes a claim to pluralist 
norms—extending to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples—offers a trenchant test for 
liberal citizenship (Saul, 2009; Kaushal, 2017). How capacious is the promise of inclusion 
amid nativist narratives of nationalism and citizenship, whose foundations are woven into a 
modern “settler” society even as they find fresh expression in a post-September 11 
landscape? Legal, public policy, and social responses to the politics of identity are measures 
of the rhetoric-action gap on this score. 
The frame of identity politics covers multiple affiliations, from ethno-cultural and sexual 
to religious; moreover, these are often overlapping rather than discrete categories. Our 
focus, however, will be on minority religious identities. Their salience in liberal democratic 
settings is evident not only in popular (and populist) contention, but also in legal-political 
discourses that cast such identities as demanding particularly high levels of accommodation. 
Indeed, legal reasoning in this regard is premised on the idea of accommodation as imposing 
“varieties of burden” (Su, 2019). An argument is developed for recognizing the role that 
public religion can play in fostering effective citizenship, with specific regard to diasporic 
Muslim communities—beyond the reduction of such a role to identity politics. “Effective” 
citizenship here resists not only the presumption that all identity politics is inimical to civic 
culture, but also the traditional liberal claim that a secular mode of civic engagement is 
necessarily more inclusive. Political theologies matter: they can foster cultures of civic 
engagement rather than conflict, to the extent that they synthesize faith, civil society, and 
human rights. In the present socio-political climate, this prospect requires taking on both 
secular and religious populism.  
Identitarian narratives—Or the Joys of Thymos  
A quest for dignity, individual and collective, is widely understood as a driving force in the 
emergence of modern liberal democracy. Participatory politics comes in many forms, 
including modern segregated polities where a minority or majority exercises exclusive 
electoral rights (as in long phases of Canadian and United States history). Without a core 
commitment to the values of equality, autonomy, and basic human freedoms—all built 
around dignity—democracy offers little more than a rhetoric of participation and inclusion. 
Plato’s Republic captured that drive as thymos, the third part of the soul that accompanies 
“reason” and “desire” (Reeve, 2004). Thymos is where pride, shame, and spiritedness are 
located; in politics and society, it is resistant to indignity. It is also interwoven with honor, 
an association that is inherited from Homer (Jorgenson, 2018, 18-24)—with all that this 
implies when an “honor code” is perceived to be at stake. For Plato, thymos in conjunction 
with reason and desire engenders a just equilibrium; otherwise, what prevails is injustice.  
 Commentators of assorted stripes have come to see thymos as the impulse behind 
identity politics: groups and individuals who perceive their dignity as imperilled mobilize on 
behalf of themselves, rather than the polity at large. In this vein, what began as a general 
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demand for equality and equity—human rights—is now a particularist mobilization of one’s 
“tribe” (social, political, economic) above universal citizenship (Brooks, 2006; Lilla, 2016; 
Chua, 2018; Fukuyama, 2018; Moyn, 2018). Tribal mobilization here spills across secular-
religious bounds. In measures of co-relation between religiosity and civic engagement, it is 
the interplay of faith and social context that is determinative (Bolzendahl, Schnabel, & Sagi , 
2019). Class, region, nationalism, ethnicity, and culture are routinely folded into the salience 
of “religion” in liberal democratic discourse.5 Quebec is hardly alone in finding that 
secularism furnishes a tribal weapon against individuals and groups whose thymos is less 
potent.    
In former-Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper’s vision of “populist conservatism,” 
the tribe is “our family, friends and neighbors,” who constitute “the people” (Harper, 2018). 
By their ordinariness and familiarity, the favored particularists now acquire a universalist 
flavor; it is their detractors who lack the proper national values. Harper’s government saw 
fit to ban as “un-Canadian” the wearing of a niqab (a Muslim face-covering) at citizenship 
ceremonies; while the ban would impact barely a handful of individuals, it appealed to what 
Harper called “old-stock Canadians” (Barber, 2015). In this narrative, the ban liberates 
Muslim women from their patriarchal values and delivers them into the nation’s liberal 
modernity—even if the niqab is freely chosen by women with professional credentials 
superior to those of mainstream Canadian women (whose own locus in a conservative social 
hierarchy was elided)(Black, 2015; Beeby, 2015). The courts rejected the government’s 
stance, striking down the niqab ban as contrary to the Citizenship Act (Ishaq, 2015). This 
version of being Canadian was embraced by the newly elected Liberal party, yet most 
Canadians favored a Quebec-style ban on Muslim religious symbols (Ipsos-Global, 2017).       
 What were the Canadian values in whose name contending governments and their 
supporters, secular and religious activists, as well as the courts, were staking their respective 
positions in the public domain? At the formal level, the answer is quite straightforward. A 
country whose modern identity was constituted by Anglo-French colonizers framed its core 
values in the 1867 British North America Act, and again in 1982 in a fresh constitution 
(“repatriated” from Britain) that proclaimed a “Charter of Rights and Freedoms” 
(Constitution Act, 1982). In treating the Charter’s guarantees of fundamental freedoms, 
democratic and legal rights, equality, and minority language rights as the raison d’etre of the 
new constitution, a classic liberal conception of national values is framed. Indeed, these 
values are tied directly to the post-World War 2 framework of entitlements in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, in the drafting of which Canada’s John Humphrey played a 
leading role (CHRC, 2019).  
In a 2013 official survey of what Canadians regarded as key markers of national identity, 
the Charter ranked first, ahead of the flag, anthem, and even hockey (Statistics Canada, 
2015). While this view was shared across differences in educational level, gender, and 
region, it was more pronounced among women and those with a higher level of education. 
But it was strongest among immigrants; indeed, “visible minorities” value all national 
symbols more robustly than other Canadians, and especially the Charter. More broadly, the 
single value that was felt by more than half the population to be collectively shared by all 
was “human rights”—ahead of the rule of law and gender equality. Ironically, immigrants 
were the most likely group to subscribe to shared collective values, notwithstanding their 
own diverse origins. No group expressed as much “pride” as visible minorities in being 
Canadian, and in the treatment of diverse social groups. For Muslim Canadians, religious and 
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Canadian identity trumps ethnic and cultural affiliation (Shah, 2019, 26-27). At large, the 
embrace of equality, diversity, and respect for aboriginal culture climbs significantly with 
education and youth.  
It would appear that the formal markers of Canadian values as articulated in the 1982 
Constitution and the Charter enjoy considerable public support, at least more than any 
competing values. Yet there is a clear perceptional gap between immigrants/visible 
minorities and other segments of the public about the extent to which national values are 
truly shared; it is larger still when it comes to older non-immigrant Canadians. Then there is 
the variance between expressing high regard for human rights, and the exceptions that 
emerge when more specific issues are raised. The “exceptionalism” shifts historically with 
regard to various migrant religious groups, from Irish Catholics and East European Jews in 
the past, to Arab and Asian Muslims today (Saunders, 2012; Sajoo, 2014). Since 2013, official 
Canadian data record a steady rise in reported hate crimes aimed at Muslims; these were 
also more violent than those for any other religious, ethnic, or sexual minority group 
(Armstrong, 2019). Muslim women reported experiencing discrimination more than men, 
and more so if they were black women (Shah, 2019, 24-25). Canadians singled out Muslim 
religious symbols and identity as ones that they were least comfortable with in comparison 
with Christian, Jewish, and Sikh religious symbols and identities (Ekos, 2017). Although 82% 
of the public give importance to religious freedom, only 68% are concerned about the rights 
of Muslims to practice their religion. This despite the fact that 81% disagree with the claim 
that “Islamophobia does not exist in Canada.”   
Evidence from Australia, the United States, and other liberal democracies shows a similar 
pattern of “liberal exceptionalism” (Lipka, 2017; Elfenbein, 2019; Hanifie, 2019). A 2018 law 
in Bavaria makes the cross a symbol of the state’s “identity and culture”, deeming this fully 
consistent with Germany’s secular neutrality amid the growing diversity of the country’s 
ethno-religious composition (Jamal and Neo, 2019). It is true that such patterns have been 
enhanced by the open articulation of ethno-religious disrespect for minorities since the 2016 
election of Donald Trump in the United States, and in the aftermath of the events of 
September 11, 2001. But they are rooted in older civic discourses. Benedict Anderson’s 
“imagined community” as the basis of nationalism was always keenly exclusionary on the 
terms of endearment and solidarity (Anderson, 2006; Smith, 2010). It is a happy conceit that 
secularism rescues this impulse from “traditional” ethno-religious preferences to deliver 
liberal citizenship as a counter to tribal membership. Thymos is embraced with deep and 
selective passion in nationalism’s name, liberal or otherwise. Recalling Plato (and Homer), 
“honor” is engaged with scope for its reinforcement or moral rebranding in the civic domain 
(Appiah, 2010). 
The citizen’s tribe             
In Mark Lilla’s lament about the emergence of “identity liberalism,” the rise of Ronald 
Reagan’s brand of populism in the United States sparked a fateful “misorientation” on the 
part of the political left and centre (Lilla, 2017). A national civic narrative gave way to 
fractured claims by unhappy minorities—ethnocultural, religious, sexual, ideological—that 
shaped in their particular image an otherwise encompassing liberalism. Francis Fukuyama 
shares this lament, though with emphasis on the impact of globalization: “economic distress 
is often perceived by individuals more as a loss of identity than as a loss of resources” 
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(Fukuyama, 2018). Hence, nationalist and conservative religious voices tell the working 
classes that their distress is explained by godless elites whose globalist leanings have left the 
once-thriving majority bereft. In calling for a creedal identity that is larger than the demands 
of particular groups, liberal critiques treat the religions and ethnicities of minorities as 
somehow getting in the way of an ideal, individualist citizenship that is overarching. On the 
contrary, “the more identities people maintain—and the more complex and overlapping 
those identities are—the less conflict they will have with people who maintain different sets 
of identities” (Richeson, 2019, 167).  
While many ascribe the trans-Atlantic populist tide in which white tribalism brands itself 
as nationalism to mainly economic causes, the evidence for this is shaky. Perceived threats 
to race and privilege played a greater role than economic loss in Trump’s electoral success—
and his continued mobilization of support by targeting Muslims and non-white ethnicities 
only reinforced that reality (Bouie, 2019; Jardina, 2019; Oberhauser, Krier & Kusow, 2019; 
Schaffner, Macwilliams & Nteta, 2018). Likewise, in Europe, race and accompanying anti-
immigration sentiments have been a key driver in Brexit and beyond (Alabrese et al., 2019; 
Kaufman, 2018). Subjective or “relative” deprivation, over and above “objective” realities, 
have been shown to fuel populist migrant-bashing in several European societies (Yoxon, Van 
Hauwaert & Kiess, 2019). Far-right extremism feeds on this identity driver more than 
anything else, even if the uptake is greater among those with lower education and economic 
attainment. The spillover effects of tribal nationalism in distant Australia and New Zealand 
attracted attention after the Christchurch mosque shooting in March 2019—countries where 
anti-immigration sentiments have come to focus intensely on Muslims and Islam (Guven, 
Akbulut-Yuksel & Yuksel, 2019; Kingsley, 2019).    
Christchurch had distinct echoes in Canada, where a gunman killed six worshippers in a 
Quebec City mosque in February 2017. Here, the overlap between homegrown white 
tribalism and the spillover from Europe and the United States was conspicuous (Sahi, 2019; 
Scrivens, 2017), and it brings us full circle to the popular “secularism law” adopted by Quebec 
in 2019. The wider national context is what an April 2019 Ekos survey found to be a newly 
divisive attitude toward non-white migrants, as contrasted with Canadian attitudes toward 
immigration as a whole. This is consistent with the data noted earlier on rising Islamophobia, 
especially but not exclusively in Quebec. Once again, education and economic status turn out 
to be important variables in the receptivity to anti-minority sentiments; but one-third of 
middle-class Canadians shared those views. Interestingly, those who identify with the 
federal Conservative party are more than four times likely to strongly oppose non-white 
immigration than those who identify with the federal Liberals. Ekos frames the upshot of the 
survey thus: 
In Canada, attitudes to immigration have never been a critical ballot booth issue. 
Unlike in America or Europe, where they have been deeply divisive, the 
differences in Canada have been more moderate and there has been a political 
agreement on a broadly open policy on immigration. There have been 
significant differences across partisan boundaries, but they have not shaped 
election outcomes in a significant manner. This may be changing in important 
ways that reflect broader shifts in public outlook (Ekos, 2019). 
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Yet there is a much longer Canadian history of exclusion, intimately entwined with the 
country’s origins. It is about Indigenous peoples whose treatment is now acknowledged to 
amount to “cultural genocide” (TRC, 2015). This latter term was affirmed by then Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Beverley McLachlin in a public speech (McLachlin, 
2015). Two years later, however, she presided over the court’s ruling that Indigenous 
religious practices which did not conform to mainstream religious forms of worship were 
not protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Ktunaxa Nation, 2017). 
The particular form of worship here involved forested spaces where the spirit of the grizzly 
bear manifested itself to a community, as it had done over centuries. This exercise of 
worship, the court found, was distinct from the spaces in which it was conducted—which 
had to yield to a commercial venture to build a ski resort. The loss of sacred spaces was 
deemed not to compromise the protected spiritual beliefs themselves. "We arrive at these 
conclusions,” the court acknowledged, “cognizant of the importance of protecting Indigenous 
religious beliefs and practices, and the place of such protection in achieving reconciliation 
between Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous communities." Two of the judges 
recognized that the impact of the court’s ruling would leave Indigenous practices "entirely 
devoid of religious significance.” Would such a distinction be tenable if the sacred space 
(Qat’muk) were not “natural” but comprised a church or temple?6  
It is noteworthy that the intervenors in that case included several Christian and Muslim 
organizations, in support of the recognition of Indigenous religious practices. The court’s 
decision to narrowly interpret the scope of legal protection fits into an extended history of 
exclusion and assimilation vis-à-vis particular faith traditions, especially Indigenous ones 
(Beaman, 2012; Mawani, 2009; Pettipas, 1994). Historical legacies of settler societies like 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and the United States today find expression in 
constitutional law and public policy, as shapers of liberal democratic discourse. What 
Benjamin Berger calls “law’s religion” may stake a claim to secularist separation of church 
and state—in the vein of Protestant tradition—but is in practice replete with majoritarian 
preferences. Quite aside from constitutional banners that forthrightly signal a preferred 
religion (such as Canada’s founding constitutional pact giving special rights to Catholics and 
Protestants), Berger pinpoints three elements that reflect the liberal state’s political identity: 
religion is individual, focused on autonomy and choice, and private (Berger, 2015, 66; Essau, 
2008).  
All three elements are engaged in a 2009 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, with 
Chief Justice McLachlin once again articulating the scope of religious freedom. At issue here 
was whether the small, rural community of Hutterite Christians could be exempted from a 
new provincial law requiring photographs on all drivers’ licenses. In accepting that the 
requirement would have a negative impact on the collective identity of the Hutterite 
community, McLachlin nevertheless stressed that the “essential” matter here was firmly 
individual. The community’s private beliefs and practices were an individual choice and 
could not override the public requirement of the law (Hutterian Brethren, 2009).  
In a trenchant critique of liberal approaches to minority claims to recognition, where the 
rule of law and public policy enjoy finality through judicial, legislative, and bureaucratic 
choices, James Tully sees “dialogic civil freedom” as an antidote (2006). He notes that 
conflicts between liberal establishments and minorities are readily cast as a tension between 
“universal equality” and “diversity,” as if deep differences in social, economic, and political 
power among the contending parties were irrelevant or of minor import. Indigenous and 
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migrant claims to recognition of their religious practices run up against an enormous 
asymmetry in the capacity to “construct the identities of others through the day-to-day 
exercise of the prevailing norms of governance and cooperation” (Tully, 2006, 23).  
Tully is mindful that no matter how seriously a society accepts civic dialogue as a key 
facet of effective citizenship, formal institutions of power have decisive weight in disposing 
of minority claims. However, in the present climate of nativism and populism, the challenge 
is far greater: majoritarian narratives of identity and exclusion impose a further burden, not 
only on minorities directly, but also on institutions of governance. Quebec’s secularism law, 
for example, is not merely the expression of a centre-right legislature; it reflects substantial 
public support within and beyond the province for limits on minority religious preferences. 
Again, as noted, the failed attempt to ban the niqab in Canadian citizenship ceremonies 
continues to play into popular sentiment against Muslim headwear of any kind. “Law’s 
religion” is increasingly also populist—though the packaging may be democratic and 
nationalist. Shortly after the adoption of its secularism law, Quebec imposed a “values test” 
for new immigrants in which gender equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation are markers of the province’s identity (in addition to secularism, as defined in 
the just-adopted law).7 It is difficult to characterize this as other than the tribalization of 
what are in fact international human rights principles.   
Reimagining Identity Politics 
If participating dialogically in the classic Rawlsian “overlapping consensus” is subject to 
structural asymmetries, fierce populist resistance, and secularist filters, then where does this 
leave unfavored minorities? This brand of citizenship, it appears, is less about universal 
values than those of its own tribe. For Lorraine Weinrib, a dignity-based approach to 
interpreting basic laws allows for critical dynamism, unhitched from the rigidity of original 
intent and “more communitarian” in thrust than the individualist model of the United States 
(Weinrib, 2004). This would draw on the post-World War 2 global trend in human rights 
law. Hence, “it is the restriction of human dignity and basic rights and freedoms that must be 
justified, rather than the restriction upon legislative supremacy or majoritarian politics” 
(Weinrib, 2004, 338). Her concern that the courts have not forthrightly done this in applying 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is surely warranted in light of the decisions 
noted above. Yet Weinrib’s confidence that judicial-legislative attention to dignity would 
adequately address minority claims collides with Tully’s skepticism over top-down 
institutional adjudication, as well as with populist thymos. Neither the individualist 
orientation of Anglo-American constitutionalism nor the more communal ones in Europe 
(never mind Brazil, India, Israel, Turkey et al.) have been spared the ferocity of dominant 
nationalist tribes. Law as “regulating conduct” in a given direction, at the expense of fostering 
“common meanings” that strain dominant narratives, will not ease the permanent challenge 
of identity politics (Malik, 2000, 147-8).   
None of this is to deny, of course, that legislative-judicial platforms are vital to minority 
equity. At the most basic level, protection from hate and deterrence of hate crimes depends 
heavily on the efficacy of laws and their enforcement. Tribal mobilization on the basis of 
religion—notably Islamist summons to militancy—receives abundant play in the media, 
national security establishments, and legislatures. In contrast, majoritarian tribal 
mobilization that targets vulnerable religious groups is a relatively small concern, in Canada 
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and the west at large (Perry & Scrivens, 2018). Further, the role of law, policy, and governing 
institutions in inciting majoritarian persecution is obvious. Yet these concerns sit within a 
complacent liberal perspective on citizenship, in which the state is burdened with expanding 
the circle of inclusion by engineering a wider overlapping consensus—in which “reasonable 
accommodation” is a major law and public policy tool. To what purpose?  
A valuable clue comes from Eugene Weber’s remarkable book, Peasants into Frenchmen 
(1976). After the French Revolution, national unity became a central feature in the making 
of the new republic: diversity, which had not much troubled earlier eras, was now 
“imperfection, injustice, failure, something to be noted and to be remedied” (Weber, 1976, 
9). Similar attitudes emerged elsewhere in 19th century Europe, and across the Atlantic. In 
this context, France’s landmark 1905 “secularism law” comes as no surprise: the new age 
could accept no challenge to national unity—as defined by the majoritarian tribe—from 
religion. Clericalism and the Church may have been a practical threat to the state’s 
administrative effectiveness; but if civic nationalism was to succeed, then religion itself was 
best managed by the state (Mustapha Kemal fully embraced the idea in post-Ottoman 
Turkey). When a fire ravaged Notre Dame Cathedral in April 2019, the separation of church 
and state promptly yielded to the Republic’s role in a “national reconstruction project” 
(Nossiter, 2019; Erlanger, 2019). In Quebec, a crucifix has hung over debates about 
secularism in the provincial legislature above the speaker’s chair, on the grounds that it 
represented “heritage” since its installation in 1936; it has only been removed after passage 
of the secularism law (Lafambroise, 2019).  
The state’s version of diversity management has multiple advantages: it claims to 
represent all citizens, it deploys symbols that enjoy broad prestige (flag, anthem, 
monuments), and it can be enforced. In short, it commands political legitimacy; all the more 
so if the state is perceived as honoring a version of dignity that accommodates lesser tribes 
(religious, linguistic, social, ethnocultural). Outright repression of the latter can even be 
bracketed as an exception to an otherwise liberal norm. Hence the record, inter alia, of 
Canada’s treatment of Indigenous peoples, segregation in the United States, racialized 
citizenship in postwar Germany, apartheid in South Africa and Israel. Such “exceptions” 
metamorphose into forms that are or purport to be, less egregious. Since this entails the loss 
of existing privileges for majoritarian tribes, the political challenge in the face of populist 
tides is to minimize liberal accommodation. Pluralism must be subscribed to for the sake of 
democracy, but also limited in its name.  
A way out of this dilemma is prescribed by Eric Kaufman, one that seeks to “value” the 
dominant tribe without compelling the assimilation of minorities:      
All Western countries have been trying to promote civic conceptions of 
nationhood to include immigrants, but the populist right shows that limiting 
nationhood to ‘British values’, the American Creed or the French Republican 
tradition doesn’t address the anxieties of conservative voters. These 
universalist, creedal conceptions of nationhood are necessary for unity, but 
cannot provide deep identity in everyday life. Ethnic nationhood, which 
restricts citizenship to members of the majority, is clearly a non-starter. But 
things aren’t so black and white. There is a third possibility, ethno-traditionalist 
nationhood, which values the ethnic majority as an important component of the 
nation alongside other groups. (Kaufman, 2019, 10-11) 
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This can uphold pluralist citizenship through “multivocalism,” he argues, where 
minorities freely express “distinct versions of the common national identity” (Kaufman, 
2019, 27). Culture overrides religion as western societies become more secular, despite the 
strength of conservative Islam. The confidence that secularism will sweep all in its wake is a 
familiar argument, dating back to the early 20th century. All the while, “ethno-traditionalist 
nationhood” has surely been a critical aspect of the imagined community that shapes modern 
liberal states. How else to account for the intense debates over symbols of heritage (Notre 
Dame, Quebec crucifix) and historic monuments, from slavery-era and civil war figures to 
politicians who are associated with cultural genocide? (Bell, 2003; Sears, 2018). “Ethno-
traditionalist nationhood,” it seems, is what populist tribes demand against pluralist 
arrangements, not as part of them. 
What Charles Taylor has critiqued as the “subtraction thesis” of modernity seems very 
much alive in liberal theorizations of citizenship (Taylor, 2007, 530-5). Here, secularism 
becomes a liberation from the illusions of religion—and thereby acquires a triumphant 
rationality in comparison with premodern realities. Taylor is quick to accept that religion’s 
distance from the public square is a hard reality in western societies, and that the state’s 
distance from religion has delivered substantial civic progress in terms of human rights. But 
faith remains, in fresh and older expressions, a vibrant part of individual and social existence. 
He recommended in 2008, as part of a Quebec advisory commission, that individuals 
exercising “coercive authority” (judges, police officers) should not wear religious symbols. 
Taylor publicly changed his mind in 2017, and he has been vocal in his criticism of Quebec’s 
secularism law for “stirring up hatred around minority religious groups” when “there is such 
a spread of Islamophobia” (Feith, 2019). This is a telling shift from a traditional liberal stance 
to one that recognizes how conflict stems from that stance. The former, in this setting, would 
amount to privileging “ethno-traditionalist nationhood,” an outcome less than congenial for 
citizenship. 
The subtraction thesis also assumes that religious identities are static, rather than 
responsive to social change. Religious orthodoxies may be similarly inclined to insist on 
unchanging identities, real or imagined, in the public domain. Olivier Roy’s Holy Ignorance 
(2010) captures this mutual posture of rigidity, and the modern secular state’s disposition 
to “standardize” religious beliefs and practices in routine encounters with diverse traditions 
(Roy, 2010, 187-213). In the bureaucratic management of diversity, standardization can feed 
rather than alleviate conflict, as the content of faith traditions is subordinated to practice. 
Non-mainstream religions in Europe and North America, notes Roy, generally strive to fit 
their practices into bureaucratic “formats” as a condition of accommodation. Political 
theologies abound in this encounter, qua how religious actors respond to the authority of the 
state—and how political authorities perceive their relationships with assorted religious 
actors (de Vries & Sullivan, 2006; Toft, Philpott & Shah, 2011). Both face the challenge of an 
informed willingness to seek effective citizenship as an entwined rather than distinct set of 
realities.  
A specific example of this challenge is the spectrum of understanding of “shari’a,” on the 
part of religious and state actors alike (Hefner, 2016; Sajoo, 2018). For some, this is about 
sacred law simpliciter, which unleashes conflictual political theologies since the modern 
state (globally) insists on the control of “law.” For others, the shari’a has always been 
primarily an ethical framework, albeit one that has inspired a jurisprudential tradition (fiqh) 
with a corpus of legal norms (furu). Here, contention with the state is more about holding 
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public values and actors accountable to moral standards that are otherwise obscured in 
governance. Gender activists have vigorously used this avenue to rethink and reshape 
patriarchal tenets and practices. Between “sacred law” and “ethical” approaches to the 
shari’a are various combinations—all of which have played out in western migrant contexts. 
In one display of “holy ignorance,” Canadian authorities banned in 2013 the adoption of 
children from Muslim countries, having determined that adoptions were contrary to the 
shari’a; after a public outcry, the ban is under review (Nasser, 2018). Explicit legal orders 
authorizing the adoptions from the countries in question were overridden by Canada—
making the issue one of political theology. Evidently, the need for “theologies of inclusion” 
(Sajoo, 2016) is not confined to religious traditions. Nor can such theologies be animated 
without civil society, beyond the confines of institutional actors (Turner, 2008; Karim, 2012).  
How elastic are theologies of inclusion? Practices such as female genital mutilation 
(FGM), refusing blood transfusions for children, and rejecting vaccinations for contagious 
diseases are frequently justified on the basis of faith. This makes them fodder for those that 
find liberal accommodation to be inherently problematic, in compromising secular red lines 
that are key markers of modern citizenship. Yet there are robust ethical objections to those 
practices rooted in the same faith traditions. FGM, for instance, has been the subject of fierce 
critique as a customary practice that has no basis in foundational Islamic texts, and violates 
shari’a tenets of human flourishing.8 Muslim feminists have grounded their contestation of 
this and other patriarchal behaviours such as honour crimes and domestic abuse in close 
readings of shari’a sources, as complementary to fundamental human rights norms. For his 
part, the jurist Richard Falk observes that such internal critiques are vital to legitimizing 
liberal human rights norms.9 Put differently, the norms may seem as tribal to the Other as 
the practices appear to their external critics. What Falk calls the “Archimedes point” where 
these perspectives must converge is in “taking suffering seriously”—which allows us to 
assert that the painful consequences of FGM ought to be intolerable to all sides, beyond 
cultural relativism.  
Still, the seduction of the familiar binary of “liberal” and its Other remains formidable. Its 
historical trajectory was tracked by Talal Asad in Formations of the Secular (2003), which 
noted that the modern public sphere in the West has always been a space of exclusions 
“articulated by power”—where “religious intrusions” are feared for constraining individual 
empowerment.10 José Casanova showed how liberal responses to the “deprivatization” of 
religion overlook the ways in which the latter evolve in their responses to secularization, 
with the prospect of confluence in civil society (1994). The post-September 11 landscape has 
proven less than hospitable to the acceptance of complexity within religious traditions and 
the instrumental value of such pluralism for civic culture. Secularism’s master narrative 
remains intact: accommodation of tribal dissent must, in return, reinforce the rationality of 
liberalism. It does so not only in judicial and legislative decisions, but in the imaginary that 
frames them as marking citizenship.11         
Symbiosis, then, resists this partitionist stance, which at the very least makes strangers 
of minority traditions. The management of difference that marks liberal neutrality, notably 
when it comes to the substance of competing claims that pertain to minority faith traditions, 
is a familiar reflex. Typically, Quebec’s new secularism law—in all its tension with 
constitutional freedoms—becomes a jurisdictional issue between federal and provincial 
powers, quite aside from being shielded by the use of constitutional exceptionalism (the 
“notwithstanding clause” discussed earlier). The populist mobilization that justifies and 
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reinforces this management is scant comfort for liberalism’s democratic credentials. Yet, 
symbiosis values citizenship not only in the political domain, but also within and between 
faith traditions, such as in matters of dispute resolution. “Cultivating indifference” toward 
the latter, notes the legal theorist Benjamin Berger, is a conspicuous feature of liberal 
jurisprudence.12 The indifference may serve well the management roles of the state and the 
law; but this is hardly a satisfactory outcome for those who favour an idea of citizenship 
beyond secular camps, amid the multiple secularisms that inform modernity. These diverse 
secularisms span liberal and illiberal polities alike, both of which lay claim to “rationalizing” 
the public sphere. The upshot, for the political scientist Alfred Stepan, is that our discourses 
would benefit considerably from engaging with the substance of what we value today about 
“toleration,” by the state as well in civil society; instead, we are distracted by the populist 
tag-lines of secularist ideology.13  
If thymos remains a vital part of the public sphere, then so should Aristotle’s insistence 
on a larger understanding of the civic in the exercise of citizenship. The ethics of philia, 
loosely translated as “friendship,” entails valuing relationships beyond those driven by mere 
utility and transient encounters; Aristotle’s “political community” requires a higher form of 
interpersonal association, based on character.14 Far from being a sentimental call for public 
virtue, philia is ultimately about the deeper bonds of citizenship, and contributes to fostering 
justice as a social value. Acute polarization, then, is the erosion of philia: citizenship becomes 
little more than co-existence, and tribal association overrides all other forms of solidarity. 
For Aristotle, the “concord” needed to counter polarization, which results from competitive 
individual and group preferences, is about a mature form of philia that takes ethics 
seriously.15 He recognizes the difficulty of such an aspiration, since maximizing self-interest 
is the default reflex in all societies—and certainly not a matter for legal regulation by the 
state. In our present context, then, this difficulty can hardly be overcome without a 
commitment to symbiosis, where civil society enables associative bonds beyond the 
narrowly legal and the tribal. This is not to claim that philia will somehow “cure 
contemporary ills;”16 rather, consigning it to the domain of private virtue impoverishes the 
civic arena. Faith traditions thrive on both thymos and philia as capacious qualities in the 
making of a community; symbiosis can tap into this reality, for a richer postsecular 
citizenship. 
Conclusion 
When the Global Centre for Pluralism (GCP) was established in Ottawa 2016—to “chart 
pathways to pluralism in specific places and cases”—it quickly became a platform for 
dialogue across secular-religious fractures (GCP, 2019). This was no surprise, given the 
GCP’s genesis as a collaboration between the Canadian government and the Aga Khan, a 
Muslim spiritual leader and the head of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), active 
in over 30 countries (AKDN, 2019; Poor, 2014). Among the Centre’s commissioned resources 
is an account of laïcité by John Bowen, who recalls the debates around France’s 1905 
secularism law and its legacy in official attitudes toward religion (Bowen, 2017). A century 
after that legislation, a Paris convenience store that proposed to avoid selling pork or alcohol 
items was threatened by the mayor with police action, unless it reverted to “normal 
functioning”—for otherwise “the neighborhood will become a ghetto.” In vain did 
commentators note that other convenience stores exclusively sold kosher products, or that 
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an all-organic store would invite no such opposition. The mayor, Manuel Valls, later the 
Interior Minister and Prime Minister of France, had his way despite court rulings to the 
contrary; the convenience store packed up (Bowen, 2017, 16). Public spaces, even mercantile 
ones, were subject to the preferences of the dominant tribe, in the name of liberal 
“neutrality.” 
Averting legal and political conflict with public culture is commonly perceived to be the 
burden of the liberal state—which undertake “reasonable accommodation” in the face of 
resistance to integration by religious and ethnic minorities.17 As noted earlier, this is part of 
a larger picture in which legal reasoning about accommodation treats the exercise as one of 
negotiating a “burden” of varying weight (Su, 2019). In effect, the state’s tribal rules of 
citizenship must be accommodated by those who fall outside its favored circle in a given 
historical moment. That circle was a rather different one in Paris in 1905, when the Catholic 
church was the target of legislated secularism, and even the right of priests to wear their 
garb was called into question on behalf of public order. It was certainly a far cry from the 
state’s self-appointed role in the restoration of Notre Dame Cathedral in 2019, with 
attendant priestly ceremonials. The sense of thymos is a shifting one, and not always in a 
linear direction. The result is captured thus by the Aga Khan:    
Pluralism is a process and not a product. It is a mentality, a way of looking at a 
diverse and changing world. A pluralistic environment is a kaleidoscope that 
history shakes every day. Responding to pluralism is an exercise in constant re-
adaptation. Identities are not fixed in stone. What we imagine our communities 
to be must also evolve with the tides of history. As we think about pluralism, we 
should be open to the fact that there may be a variety of ‘best practices,’ a 
‘diversity of diversities,’ and a ‘pluralism of pluralisms’ (Aga Khan, 2010).  
Identity politics, then, is scarcely the diversion from liberal citizenship that it is routinely 
made out to be.18 Dominant tribes have always shaped the latter, and minorities striven for 
inclusion—with occasional success in shifting the terms of endearment. If accommodation is 
the price that liberalism pays for democratic legitimacy, then minorities effectively remain 
outsiders. Militant religiosity, driven by a political theology of resistance to pluralism, is a 
counterpart to militant secularism. Both are intensified by perceptions of economic 
deprivation. Turning thymos into fuel for effective citizenship is at the core of navigating a 
“pluralism of pluralisms,” straddling secular and sacred. This calls for a symbiosis in which a 
vibrantly informed civil society is key not only to dialogue, but also the shaping of legal and 
political responses to populist tribes that act as camps rather than as communities. The 
alternative, in an age of heightened identity anxiety, can hardly be greater faith in a statist 
brand of citizenship—which would mean the end of liberalism in any meaningful sense of 
the idea. Arguably, the alternative to a pluralist symbiosis would be the end of citizenship as 
a meaningful exercise in a postmodern world.     
“Civic totalism,” as the political philosopher William Galston notes, is what confronts 
pluralist governance in its acceptance of multiple spheres of “association and activity” that 
enjoy a significant measure of autonomy; imposing a secularist hierarchy through law and 
public policy is the kind of totalizing temptation that liberalism needs to resist.19 Quebec’s 
secularism law is an obvious illustration. In that context, the popular embrace of such 
totalism points, in part, to the enduring legacy of western modernity’s claim to civic 
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rationality as the product of secularist supremacy. That legacy, however, is also hitched to 
tribal supremacy, carried forth by a populist tide. Manifestly, this tide is not merely local but 
global, not least in the wake of the Covid-19 epidemic (Leonhardt-Letherby, 2020; Unger, 
2019). It should come as no surprise that it triggers, in turn, a response in the form of what 
is regarded as identity politics—whose practitioners see themselves as defending not tribal 
values, but inclusive citizenship.  
This is readily evident to western liberal observers of the non-west. China’s hegemonial 
ideology, secularist and centred on the Community Party, is the subject of sharply critical 
commentary on its subversion of diverse identities through highly intrusive laws and 
policies.20 There, too, civic totalism is the outcome of a legacy of a brand of modernity that 
eschews affiliation with faith traditions (Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, Taoist)—except in 
forms that advance the Party’s interests—and the assertion of majoritarian cultural (Han) 
supremacy. Unsurprisingly, this provokes identitarian contention (Tibetan, Uighur-Hui, and 
many others) as a “politics of recognition.”21 A similar, ostensibly non-secular, brand of non-
recognition is on display in India, where Narendra Modi’s populist politics privileges Hindu 
identity in contestation not only with the nation’s large Muslim minority, but also with 
India’s own pluralist narratives of citizenship before and after independence in 1947 
(Chandra, 2019; Gettleman-Raj, 2019). Likewise with postcolonial citizenship in an array of 
African settings. In Kenya, for instance, the acquisition and exercise of citizenship is shaped 
by dominant ancestral identity (jus sanguinis); this is defined not only by tightening the legal 
scope of “local” belonging (favored ethnicities), but also by exclusions on the basis of faith 
and ideology. “At one time aimed at Asians in East Africa, soon to be included were ‘out of 
place Africans,’ then ‘border people’ and now ‘terrorists.’” (Ng’weno-Aloo, 2019, 168).22  
Tribal citizenship, it turns out, is a phenomenon that both liberal democratic and 
authoritarian polities can foster in their variegated ways, past and present. After all, the 
integrative impetus of liberal jurisprudence with regard to minority traditions—that 
accommodation is ultimately about progressive inclusion—can be shared beyond liberal 
polities. Illiberal orders, secular and theocratic, commonly justify themselves as acting not 
only in the interests of the majority but also as reasonable (“the trains will run on time”). The 
difference, surely, is that symbiosis remains a prospective avenue for liberal citizenship, 
insofar as civic totalism is open to meaningful challenge in law and public policy. A significant 
part of that challenge will depend on the quality of civil society as an enabling environment 
for philia, alongside the enduring attraction of thymos.  
 
Notes  
 
1 Bill 21, An Act respecting the laicity of the State, National Assembly of Quebec, Forty Second Legislature, First 
Session, March 28, 2019: http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-21-42-
1.html  The bill passed into law in June 2019, by a legislative majority of 73-35.   
2 To forestall a challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Bill 21 invokes the 
“notwithstanding clause” of the Charter (s. 33), overriding national individual protections.   
3 On the eve of the legislation’s tabling, 67% of Quebecers supported banning religious symbols, while 60% 
favored overriding the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: “Religious symbols: Quebecers back ban and 
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notwithstanding clause, poll says”, Canadian Press, 29 Mar 2019: https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-
news/religious-symbols-quebecers-back-ban-and-notwithstanding-clause-poll-says  
4 “In Britain, more than 300 scholars, journalists, and pollsters were asked to predict what would happen at the 
2016 referendum and 90% thought that British voters would choose to remain in the EU”: Eatwell & Goodwin, 
x. Likewise see Taub, A., “Behind 2016’s Turmoil: A Crisis of White Identity”, New York Times, 1 Nov 2016, A6. 
5 C.B. Macpherson’s The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) holds 
that “the most important way in which the whole bundle of social institutions and social relations shapes people 
as political actors is in the way they shape people’s consciousness of themselves” (p.5). Yet in advocating a 
participatory model against other liberal ones—mindful of class and education—this leading theorist omits 
any mention of identity politics, as if this could be divorced from the project of shaping individual 
consciousness. 
6 As it turned out, the ski resort spaces subsequently had to yield to a fresh environmental review under 
provincial legislation, in a ruling by the British Columbia Court of Appeal: Glacier Resorts vs. British Columbia, 
2019; BCCA, 289. This renders the fate of the resort uncertain, albeit for reasons entirely distinct from the 
original faith-based challenge.   
7 “Regulation to amend the Québec immigration Regulation,” Part 2:2, Gazette Officialle du Québec, 151:44 
(October 30, 2019); “Canadian province to introduce ‘values test’ for immigrants,” BBC News, 30 October 2019, 
retrieved at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50241251 
8 Zayn Kassam notes that the practice is barely known across the Arabian peninsula (or in South-Central Asia 
where the majority of Muslims live), finds no mention in the Qur’an, and is the subject of trenchant ethical 
criticism by Muslim activists globally: “Gender,” in Amyn B. Sajoo, ed.,  A Companion to Muslim Ethics (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 105-11. 
9 Falk frames his argument in the wider context of a hegemonial idea of modernity whose universal claims are 
widely contested, thus putting at risk core human rights claims that ought to be treated as universal (such as 
the ban on torture): Richard Falk, “Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights,” in 
A.A. An-Na’im, ed. Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp. 44-64.   
10 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003), pp. 184-186. This despite the fact that “politics, through the law, has profound consequences for life in 
the private sphere,” which secularists fully accept (186).  
11 “Arguments among competing conceptions of liberalism are arguments over the location of the border of the 
public and private, that is, over the point at which there is a crossing from reason to unreason”: Paul Kahn, 
Putting Liberalism in Its Place (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 123. 
12 Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2015), pp. 177-188. 
13 Alfred Stepan, “The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes,” in C. Calhoun, 
M. Juergensmeyer, and J. Van Antwerpen, eds. Rethinking Secularism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 
114-144.  
14 The Ethics of Aristotle (The Nicomachean Ethics), trans. J.A.K. Thomson, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 1976), 
Books VIII-IX, which provides his most detailed treatment of the subject. 
15 Eleni Leontsini, “The Motive of Society: Aristotle on Civic Friendship, Justice and Concord,” Res Publica, 19:1 
(2013), 21-35, discusses philia across Aristotle’s works. 
16 R.K. Bentley, “Civic Friendship and Thin Citizenship,” Res Publica, 19:1 (2013), 5-19, at p. 18, arguing against 
the civic value of philia, especially in a time of social polarization in liberal societies.  
17 Nearly half of those surveyed in Canada and France believe that immigrants wish to be distinct rather than 
adapt—a view held even more strongly in Australia, Germany and Italy. Pew Research Centre, Global Attitudes 
& Trends, 14 March 2019: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/14/around-the-world-more-say-
Amyn Sajoo       92   
 
 
immigrants-are-a-strength-than-a-burden/pgmd_2019-03-14_global-migration-attitudes_0-05/  Indeed, 
Canadians (and in all likelihood other liberal publics) grossly misperceive where most migrants come from. 
Two-thirds of Canadians believe that the Middle East and North Africa is by far the dominant source (64%); the 
figure for that region is 12% (Angus Reid Poll, 2019).    
18 In Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), the late 
Samuel Huntington forthrightly defends “the continuing centrality of Anglo-Protestant culture to American 
national identity” (p. 30) as an assertion of liberal identity, against the identity politics of others. There is no 
hint of irony in his excursus. 
19 The operative premise of civic totalism is that there are “comprehensive lexical orderings” in human life that 
can be identified and implemented by the state: William Galston, “Religion and the Limits of Liberal 
Democracy,” in Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society (Montreal: McGill-Queens 
University Press, 2014), pp. 46-47. 
20 “Let contemporary Chinese Marxism shine even more brilliant rays of truth,” proclaimed China’s leader, Xi 
Jinping, in a major policy speech, insisting that the Communist Party was “completely correct” in all its recent 
initiatives: Chris Buckley and Steven Meyers, “China’s Leader Says Party Must Control All Tasks, And Asian 
Markets Slump,” New York Times, 18 Dec 2018, p. A12. China’s Muslims, in and outside the province of Xinjiang, 
are a particular target of this totalism: Steven Meyers, “A Crackdown on Muslims is Spreading Across China,” 
New York Times, 21 Sept 2019: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/21/world/asia/china-islam-
crackdown.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage 
21 The contention extends to Hong Kong, where the majority have come to identify, since 2009, against 
“Chinese” and for local “Hong Konger” identity: Brian Fong, “One Country, Two Nationalisms: Center-Periphery 
Relations between Mainland China and Hong Kong, 1997–2016,” Modern China, 43: 5 (2017), 523-556. After 
the 2019 pro-democracy protests, the identity shift is at a record high: “Almost nobody under 30 identifies as 
Chinese,” The Economist, 21 August 2019: https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/08/26/almost-
nobody-in-hong-kong-under-30-identifies-as-chinese  
22 Bettina Ng’weno and L. Abora Aloo, “Irony of Citizenship: Descent, National Belonging, and Constitutions in 
the Postcolonial African State,” Law & Society Review, 53:1 (2019), 141–172:   put it thus: “Those who must 
answer for their citizenship are marginal for historical, social, or political reasons. At one time aimed at Asians 
in East Africa, soon to be included were “out of place Africans,” then “border people” and now “terrorists.” The 
category against whom the tool of jus sanguinis is wielded is arbitrary, random, and capricious” (p. 168). 
 
References 
Aga Khan. (2010). LaFontaine-Baldwin Lecture. Institute for Canadian Citizenship. Toronto. 
Retrieved at https://www.inclusion.ca/archive/lafontaine-baldwin-lecture/. 
Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). (2019): https://www.akdn.org/. 
Alabrese, E., S. Becker,, T. Fetzer,, & D. Novy. (2019). Who voted for Brexit? Individual and 
regional data combined. European Journal of Political Economy, 56, 132-50.  
Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 2006.Angus Reid Poll. (2019, 7 Oct). Immigration: Half 
back current targets, but colossal misperceptions, pushback over refugees, cloud 
debate. Retrieved from: http://angusreid.org/election-2019-immigration/ 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. (2010). The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen. New 
York and London: W.W. Norton. 
Armstrong, A. (2019, 30 Apr). Police-reported hate crime in Canada, 2017. Juristat. 
Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-X. 
Barber. J. (2015, 1 Oct). Veil debate becomes big issue in Canada, putting Conservatives into 
lead, The Guardian. Retrieved from 
93     Canadian Political Science Review  
 
93 
 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/01/zunera-ishaq-veil-canada-
election-conservatives. 
Beaman, L. (Ed.) (2012). Religion and Canadian Society: Contexts, Identities and Strategies, 
2nd ed. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press.  
Beeby, D. (2015, 24 Sept). Poll ordered by Harper found strong support for niqab ban at 
citizenship ceremonies, CBC News. Retrieved from 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-niqab-poll-pco-1.3241895. 
Bell, D. (2003). Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity. British Journal of 
Sociology, 54(1), 63-81. 
Berger, Benjamin. (2015) Law’s Religion. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Black, D. (2015, 8 Oct). Fight to wear niqab a matter of principle for Zunera Ishaq, The Star 
[Toronto]. Retrieved from 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/10/08/fight-to-wear-niqab-a-matter-
of-principle-for-zunera-ishaq.html. 
Bolzendahl, C.,L. Schnabel, & R. Sagi (2019). Religion and Democratic Citizenship: 
A Multilevel Examination. Politics and Religion, 12(4): 577-605. 
Bouie, J. (2019, 19 Jul). The Joy of Hatred. New York Times. Retrieved at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/opinion/trump-rally.html. 
Bowen, J. (2017). French Republicanism and Pluralism: Can They Co-exist? Accounting for 
Change in Diverse Societies. Ottawa: GCP. 
Brooks, D. (2006, 16 Mar). All Politics is Thymotic. New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/opinion/all-politics-is-thymotic.html. 
CHRC. (2019). About Human Rights. Canadian Human Rights Commission: 
https://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/eng/content/human-rights-in-canada. 
Casanova, José. (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago and London: Chicago 
University Press). 
Chandra, K. (2019, 11 Sept). The Roots of Hindu Nationalism’s Triumph in India, Foreign 
Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-09-
11/roots-hindu-nationalisms-triumph-india. 
Chua, Amy. (2018, Jul-Aug). Tribal World. Foreign Affairs, 97(4), 25-33. 
Constitution Act, Canada (1982): https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-
15.html#docCont. 
de Vries, H. & L. Sullivan. (Eds)(2006). Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular 
World. New York: Fordham University Press. 
Eatwell, R. & M. Goodwin. (2018). National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. London: Penguin-
Pelican, 280-1. Ekos. (2017). Islamophobia in Canada, Still a Grave Problem. Montreal: 
CJPME, 2018): https://www.cjpme.org/islamophobia. Ekos. (2019, 15 Apr). Increased 
polarization on attitudes to immigration reshaping the political landscape in Canada. 
Ottawa. Retrieved at http://www.ekospolitics.com/index.php/2019/04/increased-
polarization-on-attitudes-to-immigration-reshaping-the-political-landscape-in-
canada/. 
Elfenbein, C. (2019). Mapping Islamophobia (US): https://mappingislamophobia.org/. 
Erlanger, S. (2019, 16 Apr). What the Notre Dame Fire Reveals About the Soul of France. 
New York Times. Retrieved at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/world/europe/france-notre-dame-
religion.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage 
Amyn Sajoo       94   
 
 
Essau, A. (2008). Living by Different Law: Legal Pluralism, Freedom of Religion, and 
Illiberal Religious Groups. In Moon, R. (Ed.). Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada 
(110-39). Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
Feith, J. (2019, 5 Apr). Charles Taylor calls CAQ’s religious symbols bill ‘clear 
discrimination’. Montreal Gazette. Retrieved at 
https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/charles-taylor-calls-caqs-religious-
symbols-bill-clear-discrimination. 
Fukuyama, F. (2018, Sept-Oct). Against Identity Politics. Foreign Affairs, 97(5), 90-114.  
GCP. (2019). Global Centre for Pluralism—Centre Mondial du Pluralisme: 
https://www.pluralism.ca/who-we-are/. 
Gettleman, J & S. Raj. (2019, 11 Dec). India Steps Toward Making Naturalization Harder for 
Muslims. New York Times.  Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/09/world/asia/india-muslims-citizenship-
narendra-modi.html.  
Guven, C., M. Akbulut-Yuksel, & M. Yuksel. (2019, 21 Jun). Do English Skills Affect Muslim 
Immigrants’ Economic and Social Integration Differentially? Economic Record 
(Australia): https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4932.12481. 
Harper, S. (2018). Right Here, Right Now: Politics and Leadership in the Age of Disruption. 
Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 
Hanifie, S. (2019, 6 May). Muslim Australians found to suffer the ‘most disturbing’ 
experiences in public among all faiths. ABC News. Retrieved at 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-07/muslim-australians-found-to-suffer-most-
disturbing-experiences/11058582. 
Hefner, R. (Ed.)(2016). Shari’a Law and Modern Muslim Ethics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press. 
Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Hutterian Brethren. (2009). Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, SCC 37; 
reported at [2009] 2 SCR 567.  
Ipsos-Global News. (2017).  “68% of Canadians want Quebec face-covering ban in their 
province,” Global News, 27 Oct 2017: https://globalnews.ca/news/3828752/quebec-
face-covering-ban-support-canada-poll/.  
Ishaq. (2015). Minister of Citizenship v. Zunera Ishaq. Federal Court of Appeal (Canada) 
194.   
Jamal, Arif & Jaclyn Neo (2019). Religious Pluralism and the Challenge for Secularism. 
Journal of Law, Religion and State, 7:1-12. 
Jardina, A. (2019). White Identity Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Jorgenson, Chad. (2018). The Embodied Soul in Plato’s Later Thought. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Karim, K. (2012). Cosmopolitanism: Ways of Being Muslim. In Amyn B. Sajoo, ed. A 
Companion to Muslim Cultures (201-20). London: I.B. Tauris. 
Kaufman, E. (2019). Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities. 
New York: Abrams Press. 
Kaushal, A. (2017). Constituent Power: Political Unity and Constitutional 
Plurality. National Journal of Constitutional Law, 37: 92-117. 
95     Canadian Political Science Review  
 
95 
 
 
Kingsley, P. (2019, 15 Mar). New Zealand Massacre Highlights Global Reach of White 
Extremism. New York Times. Retrieved at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/asia/christchurch-mass-shooting-
extremism.html 
Ktunaxa Nation. (2017). Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural 
Resource Operations), SCC 54; report at [2017] 2 S.C.R. 386. 
Lafambroise, K. (2019, 9 Jul). Crucifix removed from National Assembly’s Blue Room after 
years of debate. Global News (Canada). Retrieved at 
https://globalnews.ca/news/5475505/quebec-national-assembly-crucifix-removed-
july-2019/. 
Leonhardt, D. and Letherby, L. (2020, 2 Jun). Where the Virus is Growing Most: Countries 
with ‘Illiberal Populist’ Leaders. New York Times.  Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/briefing/coronavirus-populist-
leaders.html?smid=em-share 
Lilla, M. (2016, 18 Nov). The End of Identity Liberalism. New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-
liberalism.html. 
Lilla, M. (2017). The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics. New York: 
HarperCollins. 
Lipka, M. (2017, 9 Aug). Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world. 
FactTank, Pew Research Centre. 
Lowrie, M. (2019, 2 Apr). From teachers to Charles Taylor, protesters vow to fight Quebec 
secularism bill, Canadian Press. Retrieved from 
https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/from-teachers-to-charles-taylor-protesters-vow-to-
fight-quebec-secularism-bill-1.4363795.  
Malik, M. (2000). Faith and the State of Jurisprudence. In Oliver, P, Scott, S. & Tadros, V. 
(Eds.), Faith in Law: Essays in Legal Theory (129-49). Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Mawani, R. (2009). Colonial Proximities: Crossracial Encounters and Juridical Truths in 
British Columbia, 1871-1921. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
McLachlin, B. (2015, 28 May). Reconciling Unity and Diversity in the Modern Era: Tolerance 
and Intolerance. Annual Pluralism Lecture. Toronto. Global Centre for Pluralism 
(Ottawa).    
Moyn, S. (2018). Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard-
Belknap. 
Nasser, S. (2018, 29 Oct). How Canada barred adoptions from Muslim countries — and 
used Shariah law to do it. CBC News. Retrieved at 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/adoptions-kafalah-pakistan-canada-ban-muslim-
1.4855852. 
Nossiter, A. (2019, 16 Apr). In Aftermath of Notre Dame Fire, Macron Urges Unity in 
Fragmented Nation. New York Times. Retrieved at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/world/europe/notre-dame-fire-
investigation.html 
Oberhauser, A., D. Krier, & A. Kusow.(2019). Political Moderation and Polarization in the 
Heartland: Economics, Rurality, and Social Identity in the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Election. The Sociological Quarterly, 60(2), 224-244. 
Amyn Sajoo       96   
 
 
Perry, B. & R. Scrivens. (2018). A Climate for Hate? An Exploration of the Right-Wing 
Extremist Landscape in Canada. Critical Criminology, 26(2), 169-187.  
Pettipas, K. (1994). Severing the Ties that Bind: Government Repression of Indigenous 
Religious Ceremonies on the Prairies. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press. 
Poor, D. (2014). Authority Without Territory: The Aga Khan Development Network and the 
Ismaili Imamate. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Reeve, C. (2004). The Republic—Plato, Book IV, 439e. 3rd ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. 
Richeson, J. (2019, Mar-Apr). A Creedal Identity is Not Enough. Foreign Affairs, 98(2), 166-
8.   
Roy, O. (2010). Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways, trans. R. Schwartz. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Sahi, A. (2019, 15 Mar). It’s time to take far-right extremism seriously. Macleans. Retrieved 
at https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/new-zealand-mosque-shootings-far-right-
extremism/. 
Sajoo, A. (2012). Faith and Culture (Introduction). In Amyn B. Sajoo, ed. A Companion to 
Muslim Cultures (1-20). London: I.B. Tauris. 
Sajoo, A. (2014). Fitting Islamophobia into an Historical Pattern. Journal of Muslim Minority 
Affairs, 34(2), 191-196.  
Sajoo, A. (2016). The Fog of Extremism: Governance, Identity, and Minstrels of Exclusion. 
Social Inclusion, 4(2), 26-39.  
Sajoo, A. (2018). The Shari’a: History, Ethics and Law. London: I.B. Tauris. 
Saul, J.R. (2009). A Fair Country: Telling Truths About Canada. Toronto: Penguin Canada. 
Saunders, D. (2013). The Myth of the Muslim Tide: Do Immigrants Threaten the West?. 
Toronto: Random House. 
Schaffner, B., M. Macwilliams, & T. Nteta. (2018). Understanding White Polarization in the 
2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism. Political Science 
Quarterly, 133 (1), 9-34. 
Scrivens, R. (2017, 19 Dec). Donald Trump may have emboldened hate in Canada, but it 
was already here. Macleans. Retrieved at 
https://www.macleans.ca/politics/washington/donald-trump-may-have-
emboldened-hate-in-canada-but-it-was-already-here/. 
Sears, M. (2018, 10 Aug). Monuments aren’t museums, and history suffers when we forget 
that. Macleans. Retrieved at https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/monuments-arent-
museums-and-history-suffers-when-we-forget-that/. 
Shah, Sarah. (2019). Canadian Muslims: Demographics, Discrimination, Religiosity, and 
Voting (Occ. Paper). Toronto: University of Toronto Institute of Islamic Studies. 
Smith, Anthony. (2010). Nationalism. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
Statistics Canada. (2015). General Social Survey–Canadian Identity, 2013. Publication #89-
652://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-652-x/89-652-x2015005-eng.htm.  
Su, Anna. (2019). “Varieties of Burden in Religious Accommodations,” Journal of Law and 
Religion, 34:1, 24-63.  
Taylor, Charles. (2007).  A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Toft, Monica, Daniel Philpott, & Timothy Shah. (2011). God’s Century: Resurgent Religion 
and Global Politics. New York: W.W. Norton. 
TRC. (2015). Honoring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future. Final Report Summary. Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission Canada. Cat. No. IR4-7/2015E-PDF.  
97     Canadian Political Science Review  
 
97 
 
 
Tully, J. (2006). Reconciling Struggles over the Recognition of Minorities: Towards a 
Dialogical Approach. In Eisenberg, A. (Ed.) Diversity and Equality. Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 15-33.  
Turner, B. (2008). Religious Diversity and the Liberal Consensus. In Turner, B. (Ed.) 
Religious Diversity and Civil Society: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Bardwell Press, 
49-71. 
Unger, B. (2019, 25 Jul). The Liberal North—Special Report. The Economist. Retrieved at 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/07/25/canadians-must-decide-if-
they-want-to-remain-a-liberal-beacon. 
Weber, E. (1976). Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Weinrib, L. (2004). Human Dignity as a Rights-Protecting Principle. National Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 17, 325-45.Yoxon, B., S. Van Hauwaert, & J. Kiess. (2019). Picking 
on immigrants: a cross-national analysis of individual-level relative deprivation and 
authoritarianism as predictors of anti-foreign prejudice. Acta Politica, 54:3, 479-520. 
 
